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of the Law School of the University of Wyoming, in 1922. In 1923, Dean
Shepherd went to Stanford, where he served as Associate Professor of Law
until 1926, and as Professor of Law from 1926 to 1929. During this period,
Dean Shepherd taught summer school classes at Columbia University
and the University of Minnesota, as visiting professor.
In 1929 he
became Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, in which position
he served until appointed to the deanship of this Law School.
Dean Shepherd brings with him to Washington a thorough understanding of the problems of the modern law school, and a determination to
keep Wa-hington abreast of the leading law schools of the country in
quality of teaching, library facilities, and scholarship of students.

NEW LAW SCHOOL BUILDING
It is with great satisfaction that the University of Washington Law
Schoo., and its friends, greet the recent announcement that the Board
of Regents have authorized the construction of a new four-story building
designed exclusively for a law school. It is understood that plans for the
building are practically completed, and construction will begin early in
the year, so that the building will be ready for occupancy in the autumn
quarter of 1932. The building will contain seven class rooms equipped
with modern built-in desk type seats; seminar rooms; twelve faculty
offices; and a large library reading room with accommodations for three
hundred students. The library stacks will provide room for about 175,000
volumes. One of the features of the building of particular interest to
those in the active profession, is the provision for commodious quarters
for the Bar Association members who desire to make use of the facilities
of the Law School Library.

NEW FACULTY MEMBERS
Two new members were added to the faculty of the University of
Washington, beginning with the Fall quarter of 1931. Professor J. W
Richards, LL.B., LL.M., and S.J.D., comes to the University from Harvard,
and will teach, among other subjects, Torts and Evidence. Professor
John Ritchie, III., LL.B., and S.J.D., comes from the Yale Law School,
and is teaching the subjects of Wills, and Introduction to Law.

RECENT CASES
SALEs-RETENTION OF POSSESSION BY VENDOR. An
automobile dealer entered into a conditional sales contract with one of its
salesmen for the conditional sale of an automobile. This contract, along
with the document of assignment to plaintiff finance company, was filed
in the auditor's office of the county wherein at the time of taking possession, the vendee resided. The car, however, was kept in possession of the
dealer, and mingled with the others for sale on the floor at the dealer's
place of business, of which facts plaintiff had notice. The dealer thereafter sold the car to defendant, who paid by check and the transfer of his
old car, for which he received $1,000, the total purchase price of the car
in question being $1,700. No bill of sale was filed by the finance company
under the retention of possession act. (Rem. Comp. Stat., 5827.) Defendant had no actual notice of the conditional sales contract. Plaintiff
brought an action of replevin. Held. Judgment for defendant, on the
ground that plaintiff's failure to file a bill of sale under Rem. Comp. Stat.,
5827, precluded him from claiming title from a purchaser in good faith.
The court also considered the case under the theory of comparative innocence, holding that defendant was the more innocent of the two parties,
and found it unnecessary to view the case in the light of the Uniform
Sales Act (Laws 1925, Ext. Sess. Ch. 142). Northwestern Finance Co. v.
Russell, 61 Wash. Dec. (5) 349, 297 Pac. 186 (1931)
The result of the principal decision that a buyer who leaves his vendor
in possession cannot recover as against a subsequent innocent purchaser
for value from the vendor, is in accord with the weight of authority under
SALES-CONDITIONAL
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the Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 25 (Rem. 1927 Supp., 5836-25) Kearby v.
Western States Securities Co., 31 Ariz. 104, 250 Pac. 766 (1926)
Patchn
v. Rowell, 86 Conn. 372, 85 Atl. 511 (1912) Stem v. Crawford, 133 Md. 579,
105 Atl. 780 (1919) Trzpp v. National Shawmut Bank, 263 Mass. 505, 161
N. E. 904 (1928) Halliwell v. Trans-States Finance Corp., 98 N. J. Law
133, 118 At. 837 (1922)
New Rngland Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germatne, 45 R. 1. 225, 121 Atl. 398 (1923) Flynn v. Garford Motor Truck Co.,
149 Wash. 264, 270 Pac. 806 (1298). The decisions cited above reach their
conclusions solely through the Uniform Sales Act, supra, and not by reference to any recording statute, such as Rem. Comp Stat., 5827.
Undoubtedly, it is true in Washington, that a buyer who has left his
vendor in possession cannot file under Rem. Comp. Stat., 5827, in order to
protect himself as against an innocent purchaser for value, since the
Uniform Sales Act, supra, has supplanted and repealed it. 3 Wash. Law
Rev. 166, and note. Outside the Sales Act, the authority seems to be evenly
divided as to whether retention of possession by the vendor is constructive
or presumptive fraud. Gump Investment Co. v. Jack~son, 142 Va. 190, 128
S. E. 506 (1925) Warrant Warehouse Co. v. Cook, 209 Ala. 60, 95 So. 282
(1922). The court by failing to apply Sec. 25 of the Uniform Sales Act has
lost an opportunity to establish the rules of this state under an uniform
and commercially acceptable statement, which by its application would
have saved them much of the "difficulty" mentioned in the case. The act
reads: "Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the
goods, or of negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or
transfer by that person, or by an agent acting for him, of the goods or
documents of title under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to
any person receiving and paying value for the same in good faith and
without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the
person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorized by the
owner of the goods to make the same." This section ignoring Rem. Comp.
Stat., 5827, which would seem to have no effect, appears to cover the entire
case.
The court finds a great deal of difficulty in deciding whether the purchaser is innocent. They evidently have overlooked See. 76(2) of the
Uniform Sales Act, which states: "A thing is done 'in good faith' within
the meaning of this act when it is done honestly, whether it be done
negligently or not." This definition virtually enacts a rule of law- WixLIsToN oN SALEs (2d ed.) Vol. II, p. 558, Sec. 619; Wooley v. Crescent Automobile Co., 83 N. J. Law 244, 83 Atl. 876 (1912). This definition is taken
directly from that used in the Negotiable Instruments Act, according to
MAr. Williston, WILLISTON O SASES, Supra, and is the England law, Jones
v. Smith, 1 Hare 43. (See page 1566, Vol. II, W rixsroN oN SALES for
further citations.)
The court's holding that the filing of a conditional sale contract is not
sufficient constructive notice to a vendee where the goods remain in the
possession of the vendor is in accord with former Washington cases, Flynn
v. Garford Motor Truck Co., supra, and the weight of authority, under the
Sales Act, Halliwell v. Trans-States Finance Corp., supra, Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., supra, and outside of it, Warrant Warehouse
Co. v. Cook, supra, Gump Investment Co. v. Jackson, supra. This is so
because the two filing acts are intended for two different purposes, the
former to protect the seller, C. I. T. Corporationv. First National Bank, 33
Ariz. 483, 266 Pac. 6 (1928), and the latter to protect the vendee, Flynn
v. Garfora Motor Truck Co., supra.
It is unfortunate that the court spends so much time reviewing the
case under the theory of comparative innocence because the theory probably has no foundation in law. Anyway it is not desirable in a commercial subpect, since it leads to uncertainty and difficulty. In the principal
case, the application of the Sales Act would have obviated any necessity
for the further enlargement of this theory. The result of the case seems
correct, however, especially from a commercial standpoint. Gump Investment Co. v. Jackson, supra, Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., supra.
A. G.
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GESTAE-OpINION OF A BYSTANDER.

The following ques-

tion was asked on cross-examination of defendant stage-driver in an auto
accident case:
"Let us ask you whether or not immediately following the accident a gentleman came up to you and expressed himself very
.?"
critically to you about the way that you were driving,
Although counsel objected, the driver was obliged to answer, "He did."
Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, the court holding: The record
fails to show that the speaker had any connection with the accident. He
was a mere bystander. Assuming the expression was sufficiently near in
time and place and also spontaneous; still, it is not admissible under the
res gestae rule because there was no expression of fact, the gentleman's
opinion only being conveyed. Field v. North Coast Transportation Co., 64
Wash. Dec. 89 (1931).
In reference to res gestae statements, Washington has adopted the rule
of spontaneity. Heg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 Pac. 51 (1921). We have
been rather liberal in admitting declarations after the happening of the
main event, having permitted statements in evidence after eight days (during which the declarant was unconscious) Britton v. Washington Water
Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 Pac. 20, 140 Am. St. 858, 33 L. R. A. (n.s.) 109
(1910)
three hours; Roberts v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 30 Wash. 25, 70
Pac. 111 (1902) two hours; Walters v. Spokane InternationalRy., 58 Wash.
293, 108 Pac. 593 (1910) one hour" Whiting v. Seattle, 144 Wash. 668, 258
Pac. 824 (1927)
Star v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 41 Wash. 199, 83 Pac.
113 (1905)
and one-half hour- Lucchesi v. Reynolds, 125 Wash. 352, 216
Pac. 12 (1923).
Declarations of bystanders are admitted, Britton v. Washington Water
Power Co., supra, but the declarant must have some connection with the
transaction, Dixon v. Northern Pacific Ry., 37 Wash. 310, 79 Pac. 943, 68
L. R. A. 895, 2 Ann. Cas. 620, 107 A. S. R. 810 (1905)
must not be in a
place too far away or speak prior to the accident; Barnett v. Bull et al.,
141 Wash. 139, 250 Pac. 955 (1926)
although prior statements have been
allowed, Heg v. Mullen, supra, Mathewson v. Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269, 218
Pac. 226 (1923)
The third party's statement must characterize the principal act. Crock v. Magnolia Milling Co., 147 Wash. 589, 266 Pac. 727
(1928).
Our court has refused remarks as res gestae on the ground that they
were narration of a past event. Hobbe v. Northern Pacific Ry., 80 Wash.
678, 142 Pac. 20 (1914).
In regard to this last proposition a note in 42
L. R. A. (n.s.) 918 comments that all verbal res gestae after an accident
are narrative, and a case that discards the evidence as narration "without
considering the proximity of time or the probability of the truth of the
matter," is not of much value.
It is submitted that a similar comment might be made about cases
which discard certain statements as res gestae, by simply saying they are
opinion. Many statements which are admitted have an element of opinion
about them; so if a declaration is refused on that ground, the reasoning
behind the decision should be given. Without going into their correctness,
the following decisions are listed as examples of the court refusing a
bystander's evidence as opinion, giving few reasons and no authorities;
Baird v. Webb, 160 Wash. 589. - Pac. - (1931) Crook v. Magnolat Milling Co., supra, Riggs v. Northern Pacific Ry., 60 Wash. 292, 111 Pac. 162
(1910) Henry v. Seattle Electric Co., 55 Wash. 444, 104 Pac. 776 (1909).
This lack of authorities might be explained by the case of Walters V.
Spokane International Ry., supra, which quotes from WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Vol. 3, Sec. 1700, page 2256, to the effect that supreme courts waste
much time in trying to create precedents in the res gestae field because
each case, in the long run, must be treated upon its own circumstances. We
must observe that these remarks are directed specifically to the question
of the contemporaneousness of a res gestae declaration, but it might easily
be that our court has been influenced to this attitude toward the entire
subject of res gestae evidence.
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If one is troubled by seeming inconsistencies in the admission and
rejection of res gestae statement, he may be helped by remembering that
they must relate to matters about which the declarant could testify if called
as a witness in court. This is pointed out in part in the case of Sullivan
v. Seattle Electric Co., 51 Wash. 71, 97 Pac. 1109, 130 A. S. R. 1082 (1908).
For example: a witness may give his opinion as to the speed of an object;
Heg v. Mullen, supra, but not as to the degree of fault of some participant
in an act; Baird v. Webb, supra.
Applying this test to the principal case, it would appear that it has
been decided correctly. Since the declarant could not testify in court that
he was of the opinion the bus-driver was at fault, the plaintiff should not
be permitted to create the impression that such was his opinion by claiming his remarks to be within the res gestae.
A. D.
MORTGAGES-NATURE Or CONVEYANCE-RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE-RENTS AND

PnO~rrs. This suit was brought on behalf of a trustee appointed by the
owner and mortgagor to collect rents from certain properties. Along with
the appointment an assignment was made of rents to the trustee for the
purpose of paying interest on the loan of the mortgagee and for other
designated purposes. The appointment was provided for in the mortgage
and thereafter notice was given to the tenant to pay rents to the trustee.
Still later the mortgagee advanced money to pay delinquent taxes, at which
time the mortgagor and mortgagee agreed that the amount advanced
should be added to the amount secured by the mortgage, at the same time
authorizing the trustee to pay out of the rentals collected, the principal,
interest, insurance premiums and certain repairs. The tenant of the
mortgagor defaulted and a receiver was appointed. This action was
brought to require the receiver of the tenant to pay a reasonable rental to
the plaintiff as trustee.
In the present action the mortgagor opposes the claim of her assignee,
plaintiff, for the rents. The lower court refused to issue a writ. But
the Supreme Court held that the receiver should pay a reasonable rental
to the trustee to be dispersed in accordance with the terms of the trust.
Justice Millard dissented. State of Wash. e. rel. Allen v. Sup. Court of
King Co. et al., 64 Wash. Dec. 437, 2 Pac. 2nd 1095 (1931).
The basis of the majority opinion is not clear, as the court state that Sec.
804 of Wash. Comp. Stat, is not applicable to the facts stated. This section
reads:
"A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance
so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession
of*the real property, without a foreclosure and sale according to
law.$'
Justice Millard considers that the above section is applicable and dissents on the basis that a provision allowing the mortgagee the rents and
profits prior to foreclosure is against public policy as therein expressed.
While the assignment of rents and profits to a trustee for the purpose of
paying the mortgagee may possibly not be considered a mortgage, it is
undoubtedly equivalent thereto at least where such assignment is made
to the mortgagee. If there is a question of public policy involved to the
effect that the mortgagor, by reason of the statute, may not give possession of real property until foreclosure and sale, it seems quite clear that
the giving of rents and profits before this time is equally invalid as being
equivalent to possession. It should be equally clear that the policy of the
law may not be evaded either by express terms in the mortgage covering
rents and profits, or indirectly by an assignment of rents and profits to
the mortgagee.
As an original proposition, it might well have been urged that Sec.
804 of Wash. Comp. Stat. was intended to cover only those cases where
there was no stipulation as to rents and profits. It is to be noted that the
statutes in some states are so worded. While it is possible to distinguish
the cases of Norfor v. Busby, 19 Wash. 450, 53 Pac. 715 (1898) and Western
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Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Mifflin, 62 Wash. Dec. 18, 297 Pac. 743 (1931) from
the present case yet the court in each instance expressed itself and cited
with approval from cases to the effect that a stipulation that the mortgagee
should have possession prior to foreclosure was void as against the policy
of the statute. These cases relied on Teal v. Walker 111 U. S. 242, 28 L. Ed.
415 (1884 which was a case involving an Oregon statute, which at that
time was identical to our present act. It is interesting to note, however,
that the Oregon statute has since been amended so as to permit an assignment of rents and profits. See Or. Laws 5-112.
In view of the expression in the earlier decisions it would seem that
Justice Millard's dissent was well taken. On the other hand the statute
might well be construed to be applicable only to those cases where there
is a mortgage of real property, not including rents and profits. In this
connection it is well to note the case of The Investment Securities Co. v.
Adams, 37 Wash. 211, 79 Pac. 625 (1905), which holds that where a mortgagee acquires possession under a void foreclosure sale he may retain such
against the mortgagor. It is somewhat difficult to harmonize a view
that possession in the mortgagee is contra to public policy with the
doctrine that where the mortgagee gets possession with the consent of the
mortgagor or by void foreclosure sale in good faith he may retain it
against said mortgagor. On this point see TnhFANY ON REAL PROPERTY,
2nd p. 2433.
On an examination of the whole case, it seems quite clear that the
court was squarely faced with the problem of the policy of the statute,
supra. In view of this it is rather unfortunate that the court said
"
under the facts here present, we hold that this section of the code is
not applicable," rather than meeting the question unqualifiedly
H. S.
BOUNDARIE-DEEDS-RIGHTS OF RIPARIiAN OwNER. Plaintiff acquired by
deed certain described land "excepting that portion lying easterly of a line
parallel to and ten (10) feet west of the present course of Black Jack
Creek." Plaintiff brings trespass to enjoin defendant, a later grantee of
the identical portion excepted in the plaintiff's deed, from building a fence
ten feet west of the west bank of the stream. The court in giving judgment to the plaintiff held that "course" was equivalent to "watercourse"
and meant simply a "stream usually flowing in a definite channel, having
a bed and banks." As a conveyance of land bounded by a stream extends
to the middle of the stream, so the conveyance to ten feet west of a stream
means ten feet west of the middle of the stream. Rossi, v. Sophia, 63 Wash.
Dec. 105, 300 Pac. 522 (1931).
Although the general view is that deeds conveying land to a nonnavigable stream convey to the thread of the stream, State ex rel. Davis v.
Superior Court, 84 Wash. 252, 146 Pac. 609 (1915) Wardell v. Commercial
Watercourse District No. 1, 80 Wash. 495, 141 Pac. 1045 (1914)
Western
Electric Co. v. Jersey Shore Realty Co., 93 N. J. Eq. 587, 117 Atl. 398
(1922) Allott v. Wilmington Light & Power Co., 288 Ill. 541, 123 N. E. 731
(1919)
yet this is only a presumption and yields to a clearly expressed
intent to exclude it, Commissioners Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2 v.
Seattle Factory Sites Co., 76 Wash. 181, 135 Pac. 1042 (1913) Jennings v.
Marston, 121 Va. 79, 92 S. E. 821 (1917) and see Wardell v. Commercial
Watercourse Dist. No. 1, supra, State ex rel. Davis v. Superior Court,
supra, Stewart v. Turney, 237 N. Y. 117, 142 N. E. 437, 31 A. L. R. 960
(1923)
On analysis, it would appear that the rule is predicated upon two conditions. First, the deed must convey the land up to the stream so that it is
abutting; the words used are generally "to," "on," "by" or "bounded by"
the stream. Second, a clearly expressed intent by the grantor to exclude
the underlying portion of the stream must be lacking. Practically all the
cases involve the second condition alone, for the land is usually abutting;
thus, "to the bank," Comiissioners Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2 v.
Seattle Factory Sites Co., supra, Moore v. Provost, 205 Mich. 687, 172
N. W 410 (1919)
"to a stake on the bank," "to a tree on a bank," Ham-
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inond v. Ridgeway, 5 Harr. and J. 256, 9 Am. Dec. 522 (1821)
Lapish v.
Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85 (1831).
The underlying theory is that once having parted with his land abutting the stream, the grantor has no use for that portion underlying the
stream and so must have intended to convey it to the grantee, In re Opening of West Farm' Road -in New York City, 212 N. Y. 325, 106 N. E. 102
(1914) and see 10 L. R. A. 208, note, 42 L. R. A. 502, note.
In the main case, however, the deed doesn't purport to convey up to
the stream; on the contrary, it expressly uses the words "excepting" that
portion lying easterly of a line parallel to and ten feet west of the stream.
Instead of being the terminus of a line running to it, the stream is the
starting point of a line ten feet long running from it. Moreover, this case
is to be distinguished from cases where the stream is the starting point
and the line running from the stream includes the land coveyed itself,
Whiteside v. Oasis Club, 187 S. W 27 (1916) for here the line is run from
the stream to determine the western boundary of the land conveyed-the
grantor retaining the land inside of the line next to the stream.
Clearly, if the court had defined "course" as meaning the thread of the
"course" was equivalent to "watercourse," see Geddis v. Parrish,1 Wash.
587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889) Rigney v. Tacoma Light and Power Co., 9 Wash.
576, 38 Pac. 147, 26 L. R. A. 425 (1894) and that "watercourse" was a
sream there would have been no question; however, the court held
see Att'y Gen. v. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt) 526, 550
(1853)
It would seem that the parties would be presumed to have meant the
starting point to be the edge of the stream and not the thread. See Dodd
v. Witt, 139 Mass. 63, 29 N. E. 475, 52 Am. Rep. 700 (1885) JONES ON CoNvEYAxcXNG, Sec. 465. The physical difficulties encountered in measuring
from the center would generally be such that the parties would be presumed to have taken the edge as the starting point. Especially in a case
like the instant one, where the stream averages twenty feet in width and
any variation would have the effect of placing the boundary partly on
land and partly on water, would the parties seem to intend the edge as the
starting point.
Even though no such presumption would be raised, it would seem that
the word "course" being defined as it was, would give rise to, a latent
ambiguity and parol evidence would be admissible, see Blow 'v. Vaughan,
105 N. C. 198, 10 S. E. 891 (1890) 1 GBEENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, Secs. 286, 287
288; 22 CORPUS JURIS, 1199, 1182.
In conclusion, it would appear that these preceding factors are determinative of the question, and the logic embodied in the statement "as a
conveyance of land bounded by a stream conveys to the center, so a conveyance to ten feet of the stream means to ten feet from the middle of
the stream" would seem to be fallacious insomuch as it assumes the very
point in controversy.
E. W J:

